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Abstract 
A large and growing literature addresses the impact of foreign aid on the 
growth of per capita incomes in recipient countries. While this link is 
important, given its implications for poverty reduction, an arguably more 
important link is that between aid and human development, broadly 
defined. This paper looks at the impact of aid on the Human 
Development Index (HDI), the best known and most widely used 
composite measure of national human development achievement. The 
paper is particularly interested in the impact of conflict on human 
development and in links between conflict, aid and human development. 
These relationships are examined in an econometric analysis of 2001 
HDI levels in a sample of 94 developing countries. Twenty-six of these 
countries are conflict-affected. A number of interesting results emerge, 
many of which are in stark contrast with those reported in the aid-growth 
literature. The main findings of this analysis are that conflict and aid are 
negatively associated with HDI levels, and therefore, that aid does not 
offset the negative impact of conflict on human development. The 
second of these findings is puzzling, to the extent that it is inconsistent 
with most findings in the aid effectiveness literature. The paper also finds 
that aid is neither more nor less effective, in terms of its impact on 
human development, in conflict scenarios.  
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I. Introduction 
The aid-growth nexus has been extensively researched. For many decades there 
was little empirical clarity over this nexus based on the results of econometric studies 
typically conducted using cross-country, panel data sets. Some studies found that aid 
was positively associated with growth; others found that there was either a negative 
association or none at all (Cassen, 1994). A rather different picture has emerged in 
the literature over recent years. There is now abundant empirical evidence to suggest 
that aid works in the sense that it promotes growth and, by implication, reduces 
poverty.  The well-known macro-micro paradox of aid effectiveness would appear to 
be dead and buried. There is evidence, albeit disputed, that impact of aid on growth 
is contingent on the policies of recipient countries, so that while aid works in all 
countries it works better in countries with better policy regimes (Burnside and 
Dollar, 1997a, 1997b, 2000, 2004, Collier and Dollar, 1999, 2001, 2002, Svensson, 
1999, Collier and Dehn, 2001 and Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). But there is more 
evidence to suggest that it works in countries irrespective of the policy regime 
(Hansen and Tarp, 2000a, 2000b, Lensink and Morrissey, 2000, Lensink and White, 
2000, 2001, Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001, Gomanee et al., 2002, Guillamont and 
Chauvet, 2001, Hudson and Mosley, 2001, Lu and Ram 2001, Chauvet and 
Guillamont, 2002, Dalgaard et al., 2002, Gounder, 2001, 2002, Mavrotas 2002 and 
Ram, 2003, 2004).
1 
  The focus on growth is appropriate. A requirement for the promotion of 
human well-being, including poverty reduction, is rapid and sustained growth. But it 
must be recalled that growth is a means to an end, but not an end in its own right. As 
Amartya Sen notes, “Without ignoring the importance of economic growth, we must 
look beyond it” (Sen, 1999). It is entirely appropriate, therefore, to consider possible 
relationships between aid and measures of aggregate well-being. There are a number 
of reasons why one might observe a relationship between aid and aggregate well-
being. Aid-induced increases in economic growth might lead to higher well-being 
through a number of mechanisms. Increased wages owing to higher labour demand 
and increased private and public expenditure on health and education (the former 
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owing to increases in taxation revenue) are among a number of possible mechanisms. 
Aid might also directly finance increases in expenditure on health and education, 
given that most aid flows in the first instance flows into the coffers of the public 
sector in developing countries, a fact addressed in a growing literature on the public 
sector fiscal response to aid (see, for example, Heller, 1975, Mosley et al., 1987, Pack 
and Pack, 1990, 1993, Gang and Khan, 1991, 1999, Khilji and Zampelli, 1991, 1994, 
Khan and Hoshino, 1992, Binh and McGillivray (1993), McGillivray (1994), 
Feyzioglu et al., 1998, Franco-Rodriguez et al., 1998, McGillivray and Ahmed, 1999, 
Franco-Rodriquez, 2000, McGillivray, 2000, McGillivray and Morrissey, 2001a, 
Swaroop et al., 2000, and McGillivray and Ouattara 2004).
2  
Three recent cross-country econometric studies have looked at possible links 
between aid and the Human Development Index (HDI), a well-known and widely 
used measure of well-being at the national level. Gomanee et al. (2003a, 2003b) 
looked at links between aid, pro-poor government expenditure and the HDI. Both 
studies found that aid was associated with higher levels of the HDI via a positive 
association with pro-poor government expenditure. Gomanee et al. (2003b) found 
that this link was stronger in countries with low HDI values, lower than the median 
for the sample of countries under consideration.
3 Kosack (2003) looked at links 
between aid, democracy and the HDI, reporting especially interesting findings. It was 
found that while aid was effective in promoting well-being, this was contingent on 
the level of democratization in the recipient country. More precisely, Kosack found 
that a positive link between aid and the HDI could only be observed via its 
interaction with various measures of democratization. Aid alone was typically judged 
to be negatively associated with HDI values.  
This paper also looks at the impact of aid on the HDI. It too is interested in 
links between aid, democratization the well-being. But it is primarily interested in the 
impact of conflict on human development and in links between conflict, aid and 
human development. To this extent the paper complements Collier and Hoeffler 
(2002), cited above, which looks at aid, growth and policies in conflict-affected 
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countries. These relationships are examined in an econometric analysis of 2001 HDI 
levels in a sample of 94 developing countries. Twenty-six of these countries are 
conflict-affected. A number of interesting results emerge, many of which are in stark 
contrast with those reported in the aid-growth literature. The main findings of this 
analysis are that both conflict and aid are negatively associated with HDI levels. It 
follows aid does not offset the negative impact of conflict on human development. 
The paper also finds that aid is neither more nor less effective, in terms of its impact 
on human development, in conflict scenarios.  
The paper consists of three further sections. Section II outlines the 
econometric model used in this paper, linking it to those typically used in the aid-
growth and aid-HDI literature. Particular attention is paid to the approaches of 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Kosack (2002). Section III discusses the data and 
reports the results of estimating this model. Section IV concludes. 
II. Econometric Models of Aid Impact 
Previous Studies: Models and Some Results 
  Most of the econometric models estimated in the empirical literature on aid 
effectiveness have the following general form: 






1 , µ + β + Φ β + β + α = − − −            (1) 
where yi,t is either  real per capita GDP growth or the HDI in recipient country i in 
period t, ai,t-m  is a q × 1 vector of measures aid to i in period t-m, Φi,t-m is a p × 1 vector 
of terms capturing interactions between aid and other variables which might affect  
yi,t,, x i,t-m is a k × 1 vector of exogenous variables that might affect yi,t and under 
certain circumstances ai,t-m, µit  is a residual term with a mean and variance respectively 
equal to zero and one, α is a constant term,  β1,  β2  and β3 are vectors of slope 
coefficients, i = 1, …, n and m ≥ 0. The interaction terms are typically of the simple 
form a × z, where the latter is a measure of the variable aid is thought to interact 
with. Variables capturing initial conditions and those with which aid interacts are 
often included in the vector xi,t-m. The initial conditions variable in the aid-growth 
literature is typically initial per capita incomes and in Kosack (2002) it is initial HDI 




  The aid variable vector ati,t-m contains either or both aid as a percentage of 
recipient country GDP and aid as a percentage of recipient country GDP raised to 
the power of two. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) used the second of these variables 
only, on the assumption that aid alone is ineffective in affecting yi,t, up to a particular 
saturation point, after which aid negatively affects yi,t. In that study yi,t is real per 
capita GDP growth. Alternatively, fitted values of these variables, obtained by 
standard econometric procedures, are used if aid is thought to be endogenously 
determined.  Kosack (2002) reports two sets of results, in which actual and fitted 
values of aid as a percentage of GDP are respectively employed. The same basic 
conclusions were drawn from each set of results. m was set at zero in both studies, as 
is typically the case. 
The vector Φi,t-n  usually contains a single element only, which in most growth 
studies is an interaction term between aid and some measure of the quality of 
recipient country economic policies. Many aid-growth studies measure policy quality 
using a weighted average of indicators of inflation, foreign trade openness and public 
sector budget surplus. Studies emanating from the World Bank typically use that 
organisation’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) measure (for 
example, Collier and Dollar, 1999, 2001, 2002, Collier and Dehn, 2001, Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2002). Svensson (1999) interacted aid, separately, with the Freedom House 
measure of democracy and a measure of economic policy which takes into account 
exchange rate distortions, financial depth and the government budget surplus.  
Collier and Hoeffler (2002) used six aid interaction terms. Three were double 
interactions, between aid or aid-squared and various binary, conflict-related 
measures. These measures related to various post-conflict episodes, each 
corresponding to the number of years since the end of civil war. A country was 
considered to have been in a civil war, and thus in conflict, if it ‘experienced an 
internal conflict between a government and an identifiable rebel organisation that 
results in at least 1000 combat-related deaths, of which at least 5% must be incurred 
on each side” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002, p. 3).  The remaining three interaction 
terms were triple in nature, in which aid, policy and binary indicators of various post-
conflict episodes each interacted. Of the six corresponding slope coefficients 




between aid, policies and a dummy variable taking the value if a country was in the 
third to sixth year of a post-conflict decade or zero otherwise. As this coefficient was 
positive, Collier and Hoeffler concluded that aid was especially effective in 
promoting growth in these countries up to a certain saturation level of aid.
4 More 
precisely, the results indicated that aid is more than twice as productive in such a 
post-conflict episode. 
Kosack (2002) interacted aid, measured as a ratio of GDP, with one of three 
alternative democratization variables. These variables were the Polity IV measure 
provided by Marshall and Jaggers (2000), the freedom scales provided by Freedom 
House (Gastil, various years) and the binary measure of Przeworski et al. (2000).  
Kosack’s econometric estimates, obtained from a regression equation without 
interaction terms, indicated that aid has no impact on HDI values. But when an 
interaction term was included, the coefficient on the aid variable was found to be 
negative and significant, while that attached to the interaction term was found to be 
positive and significant. The same results were obtained for a sub-sample consisting 
of low-income countries only, when aid was disaggregated into that from bilateral 
and multilateral agencies, respectively and when aid was treated as endogenous. 
These results were reasonably robust with respect to the choice of democratization 
variable used in the interaction term and in the vector of other exogenous variables. 
The Freedom House and Polity IV measures actually yielded identical results overall, 
in terms of conclusions drawn. Results obtained from the Przeworski et al. measure 
where close to identical, except that the coefficient on the aid variable was 
insignificant when the interaction term was included in the regression equation. 
The elements of the other exogenous variables vector, x i,t-m, vary 
tremendously among studies, depending inter alia on whether aid is treated as 
exogenous or endogenous and on the specific interest of the study under 
consideration. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) used a governance indicator, the number 
of war months and various regional dummies in addition to the above mentioned 
post-conflict episode dummies. Kosack (2002) used arms imports, a measure of 
institutional quality, the public sector budget surplus, the terms of trade, a measure of 
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openness, the above mentioned democratization measures and various regional and 
geo-political indicators.  
Aid, Conflict and the HDI 
Building largely on Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Kosack (2002), we posit 
the following empirical model of aid, conflict and human development: 




3 , 2 , 1 , µ + Φ β + β + β + β + α = − − − −                           (2) 
where HDIi,t  is the human development index for aid-receiving county i period t, ci,t-m 
is some measure of conflict, ai,t-m is aid to i as a ratio of its GDP, β1 and β2 are slope 
coefficients and the remaining terms are as per equation (1) above. The elements of 
xi,t-m include democracy and governance variables and the ratio of investment to 
GDP. Further details of this vector are given in the next section. Three alternative 
conflict variables are employed. The first is a dummy variable, taking value of one is i 
experienced a civil war of any level of intensity during 1999 to 2001 or zero if 
otherwise. The second is also a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if i was 
engaged in a high intensity conflict, defined as one involving more than 1000 deaths. 
This corresponds to the definition of conflict used by Collier and Hoeffler (2002). 
The third is the first of these dummies, but weighted according to the level of 
intensity. Three aid interaction terms are employed, in which aid interacts with the 
chosen measure of democratization, the conflict and democratization and conflict. It 
follows that the last of these terms is a triple interaction. 
Some comments relating to the interpretation of the HDI, for our current 
purposes, are warranted. The HDI can be written as follows: 
where  Ij,i  is  the  jth index component for country  i,  and i =1, ..., r. There are three 
component indices: longevity (I1,i), educational attainment (I2,i) and income or 
(material) standard of living (I3,i). Each of the variables comprising these indices are 
scaled within the range of zero to one using the equation: 
                                              I    
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where  Hj,v,i is the vth component of Ij,i for country i, hj,v,i is the value of that 
component prior to scaling,  and the remaining variables are Amaximum@ and 
“minimum” values of hj,i  , although these values are fixed by the UNDP.  The 
longevity index (I1,i) is a linear function one variable only (H1,i): the number of years a 
newborn infant would be expected to live based on current mortality patterns.  The 
minimum and maximum values used to scale this variable are 25 and 85 years, 
respectively. The educational attainment index (I2,i) is defined as follows: 
where  α1 and α2 are weights set at two-thirds and one-third respectively, h2,1,i is 
country i=s adult literacy rate and h2,2,i is that county=s combined primary, secondary 
and tertiary enrolment ratio. The maximum and minimum values of these variables 
used in scaling are 0% and 100% for each, respectively. The material standard of 
living index (I2,i) is also based on a single variable (h3,1,i) obtained by taking the 
logarithm of  purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP per capita.  The minimum and 
maximum values of h3,1 used to obtain H3,1,i are the logarithms of $100 and $40000, 
respectively (UNDP, 2003). 
  While the HDI is arguably the best known and most widely used composite 
indicator of aggregate well-being or human development, it has been heavily 
criticised  (see, for example, Acharya  and Wall, 1994,  Cahil, 2002, 2004,  Gormely, 
1995,  Hicks, 1997, Ivanova et al., 1998, Lüchters and Menkhoff, 1996, 2000,  Morse, 
2003, McGillivray, 1991, 2003, McGillivray and White, 1993, 1994, Murray, 1991, 
Neumayer, 2001, Noorbakhsh, 1998a, 1998b, and Sagar and Najam, 1998). Among 
the criticisms of the index are the assigning of equal weights to each component, the 
universalism associated with applying a common set of variables to a diverse set of 
countries, the scaling of variables and the treatment of the income component. The 
UNDP has, though, responded to many of these criticisms and improved the index 
in many ways and the index is widely used, increasingly so, by researchers (see, for 
example, Noorbakhsh, 1999, 2000, 2003 and McGillivray, 2005). One should not 
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however be blind to remaining criticisms of the index in interpreting the results 
presented later in this paper.  
Importantly, the interpretation given to the HDI in this paper is that it is a 
measure of latent, unobservable well-being which is uni-dimensional. The various 
components of the HDI collectively attempt to capture this latent variable, but are 
not in themselves measures of distinct well-being dimensions. Should these 
dimensions be treated otherwise, then one would need to apply a variant of equation 
(2) to each of the HDI components individually, and failure to do so would give rise 
to the issue of aggregation bias in the coefficients of (2). Thus the interpretation of 
the HDI as a measure of a single, latent well-being variable would appear to be 
crucial. 
 III. Data and Results 
  Equation (3) was estimated using HDI data for 2001. These data were 
obtained from UNDP (2003). A sample of up to 93 low- and middle-HDI countries 
was employed, which includes 26 conflict-affected countries. All conflict data were 
taken from PRIO (2003). The conflict intensity variable available from this source 
takes three values only - one, two or three. A value of three is assigned if the conflict 
is high intensity, as defined above.  The aid data relate to the sum of aid to country i 
during 1975 to 1999. Thus the coefficient β1 captures lagged cumulative impacts of 
aid on i’s level of human development. The aid data were obtained from World Bank 
(2002). The investment data also relate to the period 1975 to 1999. They are the 
average for this period and are taken from World Bank (2002a). The democratization 
variable employed is the Polity IV measure covering 1990 to 2000, which was 
obtained from CIDCM (2002). The governance variable is the government 
effectiveness score for 1996 to 2000, reported in World Bank (2002b). All remaining 
data were obtained from World Bank (2002a). 
  Variants of equation (2) were estimated using the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and two-stage least squares methods (2SLS). The 2SLS estimation is based on 
the assumption that the aid variable is endogenous. This is a fairly common 
assumption in the literature. It is based on the view that donors might give 




countries with low HDIs. This would appear to be a questionable assumption, 
however, on the grounds that donor aid allocation decisions are subject to 
informational, decision and execution time lags. Donor decisions regarding aid 
allocations will have been made well prior to the determination of growth rates or 
HDI levels. A donor might contemporaneously adjust an aid allocation to some 
country based on current HDI or growth information, giving rise to the issue of 
endogeneity, but such events tend to be rare. A better case for treating aid as 
endogenous, in the current context, is that a recipient countries ability to disburse aid 
allocated to it is determined by the level of its HDI. Better education levels, better 
health and higher incomes all contribute to a country’s ability to disburse aid made 
available to it by donor countries. Of course the reverse argument might apply, with 
countries with low HDIs having a greater incentive to disburse aid allocations, and 
that donors allocate more effort to assisting these countries disburse aid amounts. 
Irrespective of what might be true, it is still useful to compare results obtained from 
the 2SLS method to those obtained from OLS as a robustness check. 
  The explanatory variables used in the first stage regression were: the sum of 
FDI as a percentage of GDP during the period 1975 to 1999, the sum of trade as a 
percentage of GDP during the period 1975 to 1999, average public expenditure on 
health and education during 1990 to 1999, daily newspaper circulation per head of 
1000 population during 1990 to 1999, the average inflation rate during 1990 to 1999, 
the sum of political stability and governance scores for 1996 to 2000, control of 
corruption and rule of law scores for 1996 to 2000, a dummy variable for Egypt and 
Latin American and African regional dummies. 
Results are shown below in Tables 1 to 3 of the Appendix.
5 Table 1 contains 
results corresponding to the first conflict variable, defined above as a binary dummy, 
taking value of one is i experienced a civil war of any level of intensity during 1999 to 
2001 or zero if otherwise. The estimation approach taken was to first restrict all slope 
coefficients other than that attached to the conflict variable to zero, and then 
successfully relax these restrictions until a close to fully specified equation was 
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estimated. Not surprisingly, in the first round of estimation the coefficient attached 
to the conflict variable (β1) is negatively and significantly associated with the HDI: 
countries that have experienced conflict in the preceding three years conflict have 
lower HDI levels than those that have not. There are of course many other 
determinants of HDI levels across countries, so not at all surprisingly the adjusted 
functional fit (R
2) is extremely low. Indeed, the presence of conflict as defined 
explains only three percent of the variation of HDI levels in the sample of countries 
under consideration. The restriction attached to the aid variable coefficient (β2) was 
removed in the second round of estimation. As is shown in Table 1, β2 is significant 
and negative: aid is negatively associated with HDI levels. Both of these results, for 
the aid and conflict variables, seem to be quite robust. As the restrictions are 
progressively relaxed, both the signs and significance levels of β1 and β2 are 
maintained in the OLS estimations. The only exception is round 7, in which β1 does 
not maintain its statistical significant, possibly due to collinearity with the aid-conflict 
interaction term. Moreover, both β1 and β2 are also significant and negative in the 
2SLS estimation of equation (2). These results therefore seem robust to the possible 
endogeneity of the aid variable, therefore. 
That β2 is significant and negative conforms to the results obtained in Kosack 
(2002). Kosack also found that democracy and aid-democracy interaction were 
significantly associated with HDI levels, but with the signs attached to these variables 
being negative and positive, respectively. The parameters shown in Table 1 conform 
to neither of these results. That attached to the democracy variable (β3,1)  is 
significant and positive in each round of estimation, while that attached to the aid-
democracy interaction (β4,1) is statistically insignificant. Also insignificant are the 
coefficients attached to the aid-conflict and aid-conflict-democracy interactions (β4,2 
and  β4,3) The coefficient attached to investment (β3,3) is positive and significant 
throughout. Interestingly, the coefficient attached to the governance variable (β3,2)  is 
positive and significant in each round in which it was estimated. This contrasts to a 
finding of Collier and Hoeffler (2002). The coefficient attached to their measure of 
governance (the International Country Risk Guide measure used in Collier and 
Dollar, 2002) was found to be statistically insignificant. 




variables, defined above, are shown in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Strikingly similar 
results, to those reported in Table 1, are reported and the same conclusions can be 
drawn from them. In particular, the statistically significant, negative associations 
between aid and HDI values and aid and conflict seem to be robust with respect to 
the choice of conflict variables. At very least, these associations are robust with 
respect to the conflict variables utilized in this paper.
 6 
That the HDI is negatively associated with conflict and positively associated 
with governance, democracy and investment is hardly surprising. That aid is 
negatively associated with HDI values is rather perplexing. How might this outcome 
have arisen? This is not an easy question to answer, in part because of the types of 
econometric models used in the literature, including that used in the current paper. 
These models are either reduced-forms, or very simple (partially specified) structural 
equations which suppress the complex channels through which aid might affect the 
dependent variable under consideration.  
We are left to speculate as to how certain results might have emerged, 
therefore. One is tempted to conclude that it is because countries with low HDI 
values receive larger amounts of aid. But this outcome is controlled for in the 2SLS 
estimation, which still yields a negative and significant aid variable coefficient. The 
Kosack (2002) interpretation of this result turns on his finding that the aid-
democracy interaction is positive. This is taken to indicate that the presence of an 
autocracy is bad for human development. Due to the lack of competitive elections, 
political participation, a free press and the absence of opposition parties, autocracies 
have the ability over time to spend less on social programs, and hence HDI values 
would be expected to be lower in these societies. By extension, they might over time 
consistently allocate fewer aid funds to, or greater funds away from, these programs, 
hence leading to a possible negative relationship between aid and HDI levels in them. 
Looking closely at the t-ratios for the aid-democracy interaction (β4,1) in Tables 1 to 3, 
one observes that they are significantly different from zero at the 85 percent 
confidence level. This level of significance is rarely relied upon to deem a coefficient 
statistically significant, providing rather weak case for rejecting the corresponding 
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null hypothesis. Yet if we were to rely on it, we would deem the β4,1 significant and 
negative, which would suggest that aid contributes to lower HDI values than would 
otherwise be the case in democracies. Surely this cannot be the case. Another, more 
plausible, explanation is that in the countries comprising our sample, that aid funds 
are allocated away from social programs, at least in the short term, to other 
programs. This might be good for growth but not for human development. 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper looked at the impacts of conflict and aid on human development 
achievement at the national level, measured the HDI. It was particularly interested in 
the impact of conflict on human development and in links between conflict, aid and 
human development. These relationships were examined in an econometric analysis 
of 2001 HDI levels in a sample of 94 developing countries. Twenty-six of these 
countries are conflict-affected. A number of interesting results emerge, many of 
which are in stark contrast with those reported in the aid-growth literature. The main 
findings of this analysis were that conflict and aid are negatively associated with HDI 
levels. The first of these conclusions is not surprising. The second is striking, and one 
that is worthy of far more empirical investigation. If further research also draws this 
conclusion one would be justified in concluding that aid does not seem to offset the 
negative impact of conflict on human development. The paper also found that aid is 
neither more nor less effective, in terms of its impact on human development, in 
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Table 1: Econometric Estimates – All Conflict Types 
OLS   2SLS   
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8   
















































































Investment                           (β3,3)          
 










Aid×Democracy                  (β4,1) 
 
         -0.00003 
(-1.39) 
   
Aid×Conflict                        (β4,2) 
 
        -0.0001 
(-0.30) 
  
Aid×Conflict×Democracy   (β4,3)            0 . 0 0 0  
(0.22) 
 
n  94  93 84 84 84 84 84 84 68 
n  (conflict  affected)  26  26 24 24 24 24 24 24 21 
Adjusted R2  0.03  0.38 0.55 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.61 
F Statistic  3.79**  28.96***  34.45***  30.90*** 31.32*** 26.74***  25.81***  25.79***  21.90*** 









Table 2: Econometric Estimates – High Intensity Conflict 
OLS   2SLS   
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8   
















































































Investment                            (β3,3)         
 










Aid×Democracy                   (β4,1) 
 
         -0.00003 
(-1.40) 
   
Aid×Conflict                        (β4,2) 
 
        0.000 
(0.03) 
  
Aid×Conflict×Democracy   (β4,3)           0 . 0 0 0  
(0.40) 
 
n  94  93 84 84 84 84 84 84 68 
n  (conflict  affected)  26  26 24 24 24 24 24 24 21 
Adjusted R2  0.03  0.38 0.56 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.61 
F Statistic  4.16**  28.68***  34.48***  31.27*** 31.41*** 26.83***  25.84***  25.92*** 21.98*** 









Table 3: Econometric Estimates – All Conflict Types Weighted by Intensity Level 
OLS   2SLS   
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8   
















































































Investment                            (β3,3)         
 










Aid×Democracy                   (β4,1) 
 
         -0.00004 
(-1.31) 
   
Aid×Conflict                        (β4,2) 
 
        0.000 
(0.94) 
  
Aid×Conflict×Democracy   (β4,3)           0 . 0 0 0  
(1.04) 
 
n  94  93 84 84 84 84 84 84 68 
n  (conflict  affected)  26  26 24 24 24 24 24 24 21 
Adjusted R2  0.04  0.38 0.56 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.63 
F Statistic  5.25**  29.39***  36.63***  32.76*** 33.05*** 28.08***  27.64***  27.75*** 23.72*** 
t-ratios in parentheses. ***, ** and *: significantly different from zero at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively. 